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Among the different initiatives for regional cooperation in
central and eastern Europe, which were launched after the
sea changes in 1989, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Process represents a special type of cooperation because it
includes a Member State of the European Union (Greece),
states which are associated with the EU (Bulgaria, Romania
and Turkey) and states which have signed a Partnership or
Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement with the EU
(Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia
and Ukraine). The Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Process is built around three main areas of cooperation:
– governmental: the Black Sea Economic Cooperation;
– parliamentary: the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation;
– financial: the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank.
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
Dating back to a Turkish initiative of 1990, the BSEC was
founded in June 1992 with the ‘Summit Declaration on
Black Sea Economic Cooperation’ and the ‘Bosphorus
Statement’ signed by the Heads of State or Government of
the above mentioned eleven countries.
Whilst the Bosphorus Statement defines the BSEC’s
broader political framework, the Summit Declaration
outlines the scope of cooperation which will focus on trade
and economic matters but will also include areas such as
environment and infrastructure as potential areas of
cooperation. Although the BSEC is very much oriented
towards economic cooperation it is, unlike, for example,
the Central European Free Trade Area, not aiming at
gradually establishing a free trade zone between the
Participating States, but is only geared ‘to develop
comprehensive multilateral and bilateral Black Sea
economic cooperation’.1
Legal base
The BSEC does not constitute a regional organization in
a legal sense since it is not based on an agreement binding
under international law. The BSEC still bases its
cooperation on the ‘Bosphorus Statement’ and the ‘Summit
Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation’ and
other solemn declarations signed at summit meetings in
Bucharest and Moscow in subsequent years.
In the last two years, however, some Participating
States have expressed their interest in upgrading this basis
of the cooperation from a mere political to a legally
binding document. Although a statement of the political
will to draft this international agreement, which would
have to be ratified by the Participating States according to
their constitutional provisions, has since been included in
several official declarations it can be expected that it will
still be some years yet until such a document is ready for
signing.2 Moreover it is doubtful whether all eleven
Participating States would join in this initiative.
Membership of the BSEC
At first glance the name of this cooperation agreement,
Black Sea Economic Cooperation, suggests that one pre-
condition of joining the BSEC is to be a state which
borders on the Black Sea. However, since not even all
founding states of the BSEC themselves border on the
Black Sea, the reference to the Black Sea seems to refer to
a geographically rather loosely defined area. Also the
declarations establishing the BSEC do not entail any
condition of membership for states interested in joining
the BSEC other than that they have to recognize the
provisions of the Summit Declaration on Black Sea
Economic Cooperation. Therefore the BSEC appears to be
an initiative open to all those states who are interested in
joining it. The only really strict criteria for becoming a
member of the BSEC seems to be the fact that the
Participating States have to approve the accession of a new
state. A number of states have already applied for
membership such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
the Republic of Macedonia, Iran, and Uzbekistan. 3
However, when looking at the divergent interests of the
current BSEC states it is rather doubtful that it will find it
easy to reach agreement on applications submitted by
these states.
Once a state is a full member of the BSEC club it is not
committed to becoming involved in all BSEC projects.4
This approach is guided by the pragmatic aim of cooperating
as closely as possible without there being any obligation
on BSEC states to support projects which are of no interest
to them. Considering the political situation in, and the
relations between, the BSEC states, any attempt which
would go beyond pragmatic economic and functionally
oriented cooperation would not be successful at this stage.
This does, however, not exclude discussions between
the BSEC states on political issues such as the crisis in
Transnistria (Moldova) which has been the subject of
discussion between the states involved and Turkey. These
discussions laid the foundations for an appeasement of
this conflict.5 Another, more recent, example in this respect
are the relations between Greece and Turkey. At the BSEC
meeting in Bucharest in June 1996 the Foreign Ministers
of Greece and Turkey expressed their wish ‘not to burn the
bridges between them although, this does not yet mean an
official dialogue will be initiated’.6 Of course, this does
not turn the BSEC into a political cooperation organization
but it shows its potential in this respect.
An option for other states or international organizations
to become more involved in BSEC activities, without
however being a fully fledged BSEC state, is to join this4
cooperation initiative as an observer.7 Quite a few states
such as Egypt, Israel, Italy, Austria, Poland, Slovakia, and
Tunisia have availed themselves of this possibility.8 This
status basically allows the respective state to be present at
meetings on a regular basis and to obtain a copy of all
officially adopted documents.
Decision-making structure
The body which gives the political impetus and defines the
guidelines for future cooperation at BSEC level is – as in
the case of the European Union – the meeting of the Heads
of State or Government which takes place on a non-regular
basis in different capitals of the BSEC states. After the first
meeting in Istanbul in June 1992, it was another three
years until the second meeting, which was held in Bucharest
in June 1995. A third high-level meeting took place in
Moscow in October 1996. These summit meetings are not
part of the regular decision-making structure of the BSEC
but they nevertheless play an important role in confirming
the will of the Participating States to further cooperate and
to define, for example, some priority areas of cooperation.9
The official decision-making body of the BSEC is the
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MMFAs) which
convenes on a regular basis, normally twice a year and at
which every Participating State is represented and has one
vote.10 Eight of these meetings have been held to date.11
The meetings are chaired by, and held in the country which
holds the office of the chairman. Custody of the
chairmanship goes in turn to each BSEC State for a term
of six months in alphabetical order. Unlike the European
Union, however, the chairmanship’s term is handed over
respectively in May and November.12
The ministers can adopt resolutions, decisions or
recommendations which differ from each other in three
respects:
a) The majority required for their adoption: whilst a
resolution is in effect adopted by unanimity, decisions
and recommendations can be adopted by a simple
majority of the Participating States.
b) Their binding character: although none of the three
instruments is binding for the States, all Participating
States shall abide by the resolutions.13 Decisions shall
only be respected by those states which have agreed to
it and recommendations are merely expressions of
political intent. However, considering the fact that the
BSEC is based only on declarations which are not even
binding under international law, the structure of the
BSEC evidently does not provide for any sanctions or
measures in the event that a Participating State does
not comply with its commitments resulting from
resolutions.14
c) Their subject matter: Resolutions should deal mainly
with substantial questions concerning the structure
and working methods of the BSEC. Decisions should
deal rather with issues of a more technical nature. In
practice however and irrespective of this differentiation,
the Ministers tend rather to adopt resolutions than
decisions or even recommendations.
The Ministers’ meetings are prepared by about 20
different standing working groups and expert committees.
They meet on a non-regular basis in different places
depending on which country is willing to host their
meetings. The working groups submit their reports to the
Senior Officials Meeting which is a collective body
representing the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC
States. The Senior Officials meet at least four times a year.
The major task of this body is to coordinate the work of the
subsidiary bodies and to prepare the MMFAs.
This description of the decision-making and
organizational structure needs however to be complemented
by some further comments in order to arrive at a more or
less realistic picture of the current state of development of
the BSEC.
– Firstly the task of the working groups is not always
defined very accurately so that the competences of the
different working groups partly overlap.15 The mandate
of other working groups was sometimes not clearly
defined so that, in fact, some of them such as the ad hoc
Working Group on Travel of Individuals from the
Business Community or the ad hoc Working Group of
Experts on Promotion and Protection of Investment
have only met once or twice since they were established.
– Secondly, it is rather difficult sometimes for working
groups to meet because Participating States are reticent
to host the meetings for them. This reticence is more
connected to the BSEC states’ reluctance to make the
effort to organize the meeting rather than with the
financial burdens involved because the delegations
themselves and not the host country bear the costs
relating to the working group meetings.
– And thirdly, the representatives who were being sent
to the meetings were not sufficiently well prepared and
were sometimes very junior and therefore not able to
take any, even quite basic, decisions.
In response to this criticism, in October 1996 the
Foreign Ministers decided to reform the decision-making
and organizational structure.16 The main elements of this
reform are a considerable reduction in the number of
Working Groups and an upgrading of the Senior Officials
meeting.17 Although this reform still needs to be
implemented, it is doubtful whether it will lead to solving
the current problems since they mainly stem from a lack of
commitment of the Participating States to the BSEC’s
initiative than from the structure as such. If the Participating
States are not willing to devote reasonable human resources
to this means of cooperation, the BSEC will continue to
work inefficiently and, to a certain extent, ineffectively.
Budget
As regards the financial contributions to the BSEC budget
the Foreign Ministers agreed upon certain quotas for each
Participating State.18 However, these quotas only apply
from the year 1998 onwards. For the previous years
special rates have been used since Turkey had agreed to
contribute to the budget with an unproportionally large
share. It can be expected that the changes to the financial
system will lead to some adjustments to the financial
contributions of the Participating States. The Ukraine has
already expressed reservations about its placement in the
Group contributing the largest share and has indicated that
it cannot fulfil its financial obligations resulting therefrom
in 1998.5
Permanent Secretariat
The BSEC process is supported by a Permanent
International Secretariat, located in Istanbul. The Secretariat
plays a very important role since it is responsible for the
practical coordination between the different levels of
cooperation and it collects and compiles information which
is needed to develop particular cooperation projects. In
spite of this great importance attached to the work of the
secretariat it is still too weak to be an effective powerhouse
for the cooperation process since its staff comprises a very
limited number of civil servants from different BSEC
states – not exceeding ten persons or so and some supporting
staff.19 Even though the BSEC is not aiming at
comprehensive cooperation it would be necessary to
provide the secretariat with more professional staff even if
it is only to allow it to fulfil its current tasks.
Achievements
Considering the political and economic divergence of the
countries involved and the fact that the BSEC was only
founded four years ago it is not surprising that the
measurable results of this cooperation are rather modest
thus far. However, it is important to note, that already a
certain concentration on certain policy areas is apparent.
Some of the most important are outlined below:
– Infrastructure: A project which began almost at the
very start of the BSEC project was to compile a map of
roads, railways, ports and shipping connections in the
BSEC region. This task has been accomplished after
two years. Moreover, also in line with the BSEC’s
strategy to improve its relations with international
organizations and non-aligned states, the first joint
Conference of the Ministers of Transport of the BSEC
States and the Central European Initiative took place
on 20-22 November 1996. 20
– Investment and business undertakings: A number of
conferences have taken place and recently a document
was adopted which outlines ‘Basic principles of
Investment collaboration in the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation Region’. 21 However, it is stressed that
these principles are not binding for the States which
approved this document.
– Matters relating to internal affairs: Although this policy
area does not fall within the original scope of the
BSEC cooperation project it has increasingly been
taken up as an area of potential cooperation. The
Ministers of Internal Affairs of the BSEC states which
met in Yerevan in October 1996 for the first time
adopted a joint statement expressing their will to
strengthen cooperation in areas such as combating
organized crime, terrorism, illicit drug dealing and
illegal migration.22
The reasons for the lack of concrete results are, however,
only partly due to the fact that the BSEC was founded only
four years ago. Another important reason is that nearly all
Participating States are undergoing severe economic
transition processes. Their internal political situation is
often not secure. Moreover the BSEC, unlike the
cooperation of individual BSEC states with the European
Union, does not have an overall positive image. Therefore,
in some countries there might exist a national consensus
on future membership of the European Union,23 but this
does not, likewise, apply to membership of the BSEC.
Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC (PABSEC)
In February 1993, thus only eight months after the BSEC
had been established, the speakers of the national
parliaments of the BSEC states signed an agreement to
establish a Parliamentary Assembly which should
complement and support the intergovernmental
cooperation of the BSEC.24
Membership of the PABSEC and relations with the BSEC
Initially only nine of the eleven BSEC states participated
in this initiative. In June 1995, Greece joined PABSEC as
its tenth member; Bulgaria still attends the PABSEC
meetings only as an observer. As regards new members of
PABSEC, although neither the agreement establishing
PABSEC nor its Rules of Procedure indicate clearly whether
membership of PABSEC is limited to BSEC states or not,
it can be assumed that PABSEC is only open to BSEC
states since the task of PABSEC is, among others things,
to urge ‘national parliaments of the Participating States to
enact legislation needed for implementation of decisions
taken’ at BSEC level.25 Observer status with PABSEC,
however, is granted independently of the BSEC.26
In a formal sense the BSEC and PABSEC are two
separate cooperation structures. However, PABSEC has
always expressed its interest in closer cooperation with the
BSEC. Even in its founding declaration of February 1993,
PABSEC aimed its objectives at the principles and goals
embodied in the Summit Declaration adopted in Istanbul.
Due to the fact that the BSEC was very hesitant to establish
formalised cooperation structures, only some guidelines
were adopted in April 1996 – guidelines which should
help to build an organizational bridge between the two
structures.27 These guidelines firstly formalize the currently
informal practice of exchanging information and sending,
upon invitation, representatives of BSEC and PABSEC to
meetings of the other body respectively. Secondly, as a
new element, these guidelines open up the opportunity of
officially organizing joint meetings at different levels.
Although these guidelines can be considered as a step
towards a more coherent organizational structure they still
leave the BSEC and PABSEC as formally separate
initiatives.
Organizational and decision-making structure
PABSEC is composed of 70 members, who are all members
of national parliaments of the BSEC states. The number of
seats per country is calculated on the basis of the size of the
country’s population. The smallest delegations comprise
four members (Albania, Armenia, and Moldova) and the
largest delegation comes from Russia which sends 12
members.
Since its first meeting in Istanbul in June 1993,
PABSEC has met regularly twice a year in different
cities.28
PABSEC has established three permanent committees
covering broadly economic, political and cultural issues.
The committees submit reports and draft recommendations
to the PABSEC plenary session which approves the reports
and adopts the recommendations by absolute majority. As6
a result of the fact that PABSEC and BSEC formally
constitute two distinctive cooperation structures, the
recommendations of PABSEC are not officially taken into
consideration by the BSEC.
The voting procedure applied within PABSEC, which
was subject to criticism from some PABSEC members as
not being properly democratic,29 takes into consideration
the great political sensitivity between the PABSEC states.
Votes on subject matters are not held on the basis of every
individual parliamentarian having a vote but only on a
basis of delegations which then have one vote each.
Individual votes where every Parliamentarian has one vote
are only held on matters involving personnel e.g. the
election of the president or the treasurer of PABSEC. 30
This rule is unfortunate for two reasons: First, it does not
take into consideration the different size of the delegations.
Hence the vote of e.g. the Russian or the Turkish delegation
counts as much as the vote of the Albanian or Armenian
delegation. Second, and more important, in view of the
political culture within PABSEC, there is a great risk that
opposition members within delegations, who may have
different views on certain matters from their colleagues
from the ruling party, cannot even express their stance in
votes because usually the government representatives will
form the majority within a delegation.
As is the case with the BSEC, PABSEC is also served
by a Permanent International Secretariat located in Istanbul
in the same building as the BSEC secretariat and with a
similarly limited personnel.
Budget
Financially, PABSEC – as is the case with the BSEC – is
still largely dependent on Turkey which financed the
entire budget of PABSEC up to 1995. From 1996 onwards
the PABSEC states will start contributing to the PABSEC
budget. The aim is, over a period of time, to make the share
of each PABSEC state, as close as is possible, equal to its
BSEC share.31
Achievements
So far PABSEC has not focused on priority areas and, as
such, it has not followed the same path of development as
the BSEC. In its recommendations it has addressed issues
ranging from legislative harmonisation among BSEC States
to the improvement of customs regulations among the
BSEC States, the coordinated fight against organized crime
and cooperation among the PABSEC Member Countries to
improve education. In its session in Ankara in November
1995, when it reviewed the implementation of its
recommendations, the parliamentarians strongly called for
concrete action at national level on the areas in question.32
But, as PABSEC cannot exert any power through the
BSEC, it is unlikely that the Ministers will react to this call
for action. PABSEC’s main source of influence derives
from the fact that it consists of national parliamentarians
who can – when back in their national parliaments – exert
influence on their respective governments.
Therefore, the main interest of PABSEC members
seems to be concentrated on informing each other about
the current situation in PABSEC states with respect to the
issue being discussed. Whether this will lead to an increased
awareness of this avenue of cooperation amongst
parliamentarians when they go back to their national
political systems is still an open question.
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB)
The plan to create a BSEC Bank was first mentioned in the
summit declaration adopted in 1992. However, it took two
more years to draft the agreement establishing the Bank
which was then signed by the Foreign Ministers at their
meeting in Tbilisi in June 1994. The purpose of the
BSTDB, located in Thessaloniki, Greece, is to contribute
effectively to the transition process of the Member States
towards economic prosperity of the region and to finance
and promote regional projects, trade activities, investment
or development programmes and other banking services
for the public and private sectors in the Member States.
As of September 1996 seven of the eleven BSEC states
had ratified the agreement. However, since only two of
them, Greece and Romania, have fully completed the
ratification process the Bank was still not operational by
the end of 1996. The agreement establishing the Bank
stipulates one billion Special Drawing Rights as the Bank’s
founding capital, if all countries subscribe their maximum
number of shares indicated in the agreement.33
Legal status and organizational structure
Unlike the BSEC and PABSEC which do not have a solid
legal base for their cooperation agreement, the Bank is an
international organization like the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). It is governed
by a Board of Governors. Every Member State of the Bank
is represented on the Board by a Governor and an Alternate
Governor. The competences of the Board of Governors are
wide ranging and cover, inter alia, the power to amend the
Bank agreement and (temporarily) suspend Member States
if they do not meet their commitments resulting from the
agreement.34 Decisions on these issues require a unanimous
vote of the Board. Unlike the vote in the MMFAs the votes
of each of the Governors are weighted according to the
financial contribution of each Member State to the Bank’s
founding capital. The Board of Governors elects a President
from among its number.35
As regards the (in)dependency of the Bank from/on its
Member States, the Agreement remains ambiguous. On
the one hand the Agreement states that ‘each Governor and
each Alternate Governor shall serve at the pleasure of the
appointing Member’.36 On the other hand it says that the
Bank in general, the Board of Directors37 and the staff of
the Bank in particular ‘shall, in their decisions, take into
account only considerations relevant to the Bank’s purpose,
functions, and operation as set out in this Agreement. (...)
Each Member of the Bank shall respect the international
and non-political character of this duty and shall refrain
from all attempts to influence any of them in the discharge
of their duties.’38
Achievements
Since the Bank is not yet operational, we cannot assess its
impact on the BSEC and cooperation between the BSEC
states. However, for several reasons the Bank constitutes
a special element within the Black Sea cooperation structure
which has the potential to give further impetus to the
cooperation agreement.7
– Firstly the Agreement establishing the Bank requires
ratification according to the constitutions of the BSEC
states. It will then be an agreement binding under
international law.
– Secondly the Agreement establishes a close link
between the financial contribution of each Member to
the Bank and its voting power in the Bank’s decision-
making bodies, i.e. the Board of Governors and the
Board of Directors. In other words, the larger the
number of shares a Participating State has, the more
say it has on the Board of Governors and the Board of
Directors.
– Thirdly, the Agreement establishes a close and direct
link between the full completion of the ratification
process in a Member State and the carrying out of its
financial commitment resulting therefrom. And, on
the other side of the coin, the Agreement provides for
sanctions in the event that a Member State does not
meet its financial commitments resulting from the
Agreement. In such a case that percentage of the
Member State’s voting power corresponding to that
percentage of the amount unpaid cannot be exercised.
– Fourthly the Bank is financially supported by the
European Union. At the request of Greece, the European
Commission agreed to allocate ECU 250,000, through
its Tacis and Phare budgets, to finance the ‘business
plan’ to get the Bank fully operating.39
Although the above would suggest that the Bank could
contribute to more intensified cooperation between the
BSEC States, it will nevertheless be of crucial importance
that the Bank be able to maintain a certain distance from
the political interests of individual Participating States
since – as the BSEC process has already shown – financial
issues have to be handled with at least as equal a sensitivity
as political issues.
Future Prospects
When considering existing political tensions among the
BSEC States it can be assumed that the BSEC process will
keep its current combined approach of a flexible
organizational structure on the one hand and concentration
on concrete cooperation projects on the other hand. But
this flexibility, though necessary in the light of the political
instability existing in the region, should not be confused
with non-commitment of the Participating States.
The first few years of cooperation were characterised
by a very low degree of commitment from the majority of
the Participating States. This has to be changed in order for
such cooperation to be on a sounder basis in any future
projects. Some aspects which would be evidence of a
deeper commitment to flexible cooperation are outlined
below:
– Firstly, the cooperation between the States should be
reinforced under a legally binding agreement to be
ratified by the BSEC States. This would increase the
credibility of the cooperation agreement both internally
and vis-à-vis third party states. The ratification process
would bring the BSEC to the more prominent notice of
the national political elite which might encourage
discussion on the national interest the respective state
can pursue in the BSEC.
– Secondly, if such cooperation should lead to concrete
results, even only in very selective and particular
projects, the regular and institutionalised follow-up of
resolutions adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
should be established. This could have the effect that
regulations would not so much deal with political
questions but focus more on specific cooperation
projects of a rather technical nature.
– Thirdly, in order to meet the democratic ambitions of
a number of Participating States it would be advisable
to establish a coherent structure between the BSEC
and PABSEC which includes a formalised exchange –
and not only on an ad hoc basis – of information and
which confers on parliamentarians the right to ask
questions of the BSEC governments.
– The fourth and final aspect is geared to the international
community in general and to the European Union in
particular. Although the European Union has expressed
its will to support regional cooperation, in the case of
the BSEC process it has been rather hesitant to do so.40
This is surprising especially when we consider the fact
that Greece, being both a member of the BSEC and the
European Union, considers itself a bridge between
these two cooperative entities with a view to facilitating
exchange between them.41 Moreover, two other
Member States of the European Union, viz. Austria
and Italy, hold observer status with the BSEC. This
lack of continuous support can be explained by the fact
that the European Union has not yet established a
coherent overall strategy towards regional cooperation
in central and eastern Europe including the BSEC
process. Currently two BSEC States (Bulgaria and
Romania) which are active within and committed to
the BSEC process are aiming to join the European
Union in the foreseeable future. Especially with regard
to the associated countries’ stance towards the BSEC
process it is of crucial importance how the European
Union defines its position towards this regional
cooperation initiative. Should the BSEC prove either
to turn into a long-term waiting room for these countries
aiming at becoming a member of the European Union
or if this cooperation initiative is not seen to have any
positive advantage in their drive towards membership
of or close cooperation with the European Union, it is
rather unlikely that the BSEC process will develop
into a reliable regional vehicle of cooperation since
such countries, if not the others, will be very cautious
in affording it further support. ❑
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prepares the work of the Governors, takes decisions
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38. Agreement Establishing the Black Sea Trade and
Development Bank, Article 31.
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BSEC as a cooperation initiative are the International
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41. For example, see Speech by Iosif Micheloyianis, Member
of Parliament, PASOK, at: PABSEC, Third Plenary
Session, Draft Minutes of the Spring Session of the General
Assembly, Bucharest, 20-22 June 1994, Doc. GA 558/94.
Statement by Constantinos Stephanopoulos, President of
the Hellenic Republic, at: High Level Meeting of the
Participating States of the BSEC, Bucharest, 30 June
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